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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the question of which substantive law
is to be applied in cases in which a multistate publication of de-
famatory matter is alleged. It must be recognized that there are two
distinct steps which must be taken to solve such a case under ex-
isting law. These are considered under the headings of "single pub-
lication rule" and "choice of law" in that order.
11. SINGLE PUBLICATION RuLE
Under the common law, each publication of libellous matter
gave rise to a separate cause of action.' In England, such a principle
did not create a hardship upon the courts because of the existence
of a single body of law. The application of the same principle in
this country, however, results in the dilemma that, if there is a
publication in a number of states, separate torts exist in each, so
that, presumably, the substantive law of each state must be applied
as to the causes of action existing there.2
The practical difficulty of applying several bodies of law in
one case, or, in the alternative, of requiring separate law suits in
all of the states in which there was a publication, has led many
courts to adopt the "single publication rule," which provides that
a series of publications of the same matter create only one cause
of action.3 A number of states, however, still adhere to the common
law rule.4 The problem is recognized by Judge Learned Hand in
Mattox v. News Syndicate Co.,5 where he states:
We assume that in any event a plaintiff must recover in
one action all his damages for all the publications, wher-
ever made; but, if the publication in each state is a separate
wrong, the extent of the liability may vary in the separate
jurisdictions: for instance, in the case at bar the law of
New York may differ from that of Virginia. It would cer-
tainly be an unworkable procedure to tell a jury that they
should award damages, so far as they were suffered in
I Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 72 (1849).
2 See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. den. 334
U.S. 838.
3 Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193, 37 A.L!.R
898 (1921); Stephenson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.
Tex. 1952); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S. 2d
640 (1938).
4 See Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W.). Wis. 1947);
Barry v. Kirdand, 149 Neb. 839, 32 N.W. 2d 757 (1948).
5 176 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 858.
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state X, according to one measure, and, so far as they were
suffered in state Y, according to another.
Due to the hesitance of some courts to adopt the single publi-
cation rule by decision, there has been a call for legislative action,
either by uniform act or act of Congress, to alleviate the problem.6
In response, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has drafted the Uniform Single Publication Act.7 Sec-
tion one of the act provides:
SECTION I. No person shall have more than one cause
of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of
privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publi-
cation or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition
of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presenta-
tion to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or tele-
vision or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery
in any action shall include all damages for any such tort
suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
As stated by the drafters in the prefatory note, "The intention
is to adopt the [single publication] rule as it has been developed
at common law in the states which have accepted it." There is seri-
ous doubt whether the uniform act will accomplish this purpose,
due to the language employed. The drafters state that one "edition,"
"presentation to an audience," or "broadcast" shall result in a single
cause of action. If these words are given their ordinary meanings,
the act does not adopt the rule as developed by the courts, but,
rather, restricts it to one event in time, such as a single presentation
of a play or movie. A series of performances, radio or television
transcriptions, or late editions of a newspaper or magazine might
well give rise to separate causes of action.
On the other hand, if the courts should construe the statute
liberally, with a view toward effectuating its stated purpose, its
adoption would provide a greatly needed tool for the solution of
choice of law cases in this field.
A failure to adopt the single publication rule can be expected
to lead to the unsatisfactory conclusion reached by the court in
Hartmann v. Time, Inc.8 The holding in that case was that, as to
those states in which the rule has been adopted, one law can be
applied, but as to those which adhere to the common law doctrine,
the law of each must be applied to determine substantive issues.
III. CHOICE OF LAW
A solution of the problem as to whether a multistate libel
creates one or many causes of action serves merely to introduce
the choice of law problem which is involved. Assuming that all of
660 HAiv. L. REv. 941 (1947); 61 HIL&v. L. REV. 1460 (1948); 32 fnm. L.
Rzv. 734 (1948).
7 Approved and recommended for enactment in September, 1952.
8 Supra, note 2.
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the states in which a publication was made have adopted, by de-
cision or statute, the single publication rule, the question arises
as to which law should be applied to determine the substantive is-
sues in the case. It is on this point that the courts have created
the greatest confusion.0
It is generally accepted that the law of the place of injury is
applied to the substantive issues in a tort action.'0 The difficulty
encountered by the courts is the application of this test. In an at-
tempt to apply it, they have arrived at a number of criteria for
determining which body of law controls. These are set out below
with a criticism of each.
(1) SumsTAxVE LAw op' =hE FoRum
Forum law has been applied in a great number of cases in-
volving a multistate libel, with varying degrees of justification.
In some cases, the allegation of publication has been restricted
to the state in which the proceeding is being prosecuted,1 so that
regardless whether there was in fact a national publication, the
court is restricted to forum law.
In other cases, the matter upon which an appeal is grounded
is a procedural one, going only to the remedy and not to the right
involved, so that an application of local law is justified.12
Also, it is apparent that in some cases the choice of law prob-
lem has not occurred to the parties so that forum law was applied
automatically. 3
At least one court has knowingly applied the substantive law
of the forum, in a case in which there was a national publication.14
Little justification can be offered for an application of forum law
in view of the feeling of the courts that the place where suit is
brought should not affect the outcome of the case. The only basis
upon which such 'an approach has been justified is that the avail-
able alternatives result in insurmountable practical difficulties in
presenting the case to a jury, whereas, using this approach, the
court can accurately charge the jury on the law in the case.1 The
obvious answer to this line of reasoning is that the courts do not
normally react to an argument of expediency in disregard of sub-
9 For a criticism of the approaches taken by the courts, see 32 MiNWx. L.
REv. 734 (1948); 60 HARv. L. REv. 941 (1947).
10 Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 65 F. 2d 499 (1st Cir. 1933); 15 C.J.S. 899.
11 Wright v. R.ItO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944);
Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F. 2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1942).
12 Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500 (MD. Pa. 1951); McGlue
v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946).
13 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Baker v. Haldeman-
Julius, 149 Kan. 560, 88 P. 2d 1065 (1939).





(2) PLACE OF Tm DFENDAw's ACT
Although several writers suggest that this is a criterion for
determining the law to be applied,17 they cite no cases in which it
has been applied, and none have been observed. It is doubtful that
any cases will be found, due to the inherent problems involved. As
a practical difficulty, the court would have the situation in which
the defendant's acts took place in more than one state, as in the
Hartmann. case.' s Another problem lies in the possibility that such
a doctrine would encourage the migration of persons most sus-
ceptible to libel suits to states having protective laws, thus defeat-
ing the general policies of the law.
(3) PLACE OF FIRST PUBICATION
Under general tort law, a cause of action for libel arises upon
the publication of the defamatory matter.19 Since it is not necessary
to prove damages if the words are libellous per se,20 the cause of
action is complete upon the first publication. Using this line of
reasoning, it has been held that the law of the state in which the
first publication is made should be applied to the substantive is-
sues in the case.21 In theory, this conclusion follows logically and
should be an answer to the problem It, too, however, has practical
difficulties.
One difficulty is the determination, in the event of a simul-
taneous or near simultaneous publication in several states, of the
state in which the first publication was made. Another, raised in
the previous section, is the fact that the libel-conscious publisher
could pick the state in which to make his first publication, so as to
be held accountable under the most beneficial law.
(4) PLACE WHERE THE PLAINTIFF is ACTUALLY DAMAGED
In Mattox v. News Syndicate, Inc.,22 the complaint alleged,
inter alia, that the plaintiff was a resident of Virginia and that
libellous matter had been published about her by the defendant
1 6 See Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. 1951).
17See 60 HAv. L. Rnv. 941 (1947); 32 Mnaw. L. REv. 734 (1948), citing
HAcocx, ToaRs iN THE CoNsrce OF LAWS 252 (1942) and CooK, LOGICAL AM
LzsAL BAsEs OF THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 315-18 (1942).
18 Supra, note 2.
19Albi v. Street & Smith Publications, 140 F. 2d 310 (9th Cir. 1944);
Sarkees v. Warner-West Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 37 At. 2d 544 (1944).20 Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F. 2d 836, 110 A.L.R. 393 (D.C. App.
1937); Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. 2d 860 (1941).
21 Sweeney v. Phila. Record Co., 126 F. 2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1942); Banks v.
King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); see P sTATL-
xENr, CosNcr or LAws § 377.
2 2 Supra, note 5.
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in a New York newspaper. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff
was not known outside her home state, took a realistic approach
toward the choice of law problem and held that, since the plaintiff
was damaged only in Virginia, the law of that state would be ap-
plied.
A similar decision was handed down in the case of Caldwell
v. Crowel-Collier Pub. Co.,23 in which the court said, "Publication
is averred in Florida and throughout the United States, but the
injury must have occurred mainly in Florida where the plaintiff re-
sides and holds office, and the law of Florida is principally to be
regarded."
There is much to be said for this line of reasoning. It recog-
nizes the strong contact which the state of actual injury has with
the transaction, and it is not subject to many of the criticisms made
previously, to the effect that either the plaintiff or the defendant
can decide which law is to be applied by choosing a forum. One
shortcoming is that, in the case of a nationally known figure, the
plaintiff will suffer actual damage in several states, so that no one
of them would be more related to the transaction than the others.
One court which has passed upon this theory rejected it in
favor of the application of the law of each state in which a publi-
cation occurred.24
(5) EACH PLACE OF PUBLICATION
This is the result which follows from the common law doctrine
that each publication results in a separate tort. Some courts, re-
fusing to recognize the existence of a single cause of action for
libel, have held that the law of each state must be applied to de-
termine liability for a publication occurring in that state.25 In HOw-
ser v. Pearson, the court recognized that such a holding would re-
sult in practical difficulties, but it stated that it is the responsibility
of the trial judge to devise proper means for the submission of
issues to the jury.26 The objections to this approach were considered
under the heading of the single publication rule, so that repetition
here is not necessary.
(6) PLACE OF PRINCIPAL CIRCULATION
The same considerations which led the court in the Mattox
case2 7 to decide that the law of the state where the plaintiff was
actually damaged should be applied are persuasive here, to a limit-
ed degree. If the plaintiff is a nationally known figure, his real
23 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. den. 332 U.S. 766.
24 Howser v. Pearson, supra, note 16.
2 S Hartmann v. Time, Inc., supra, note 2; Howser v. Pearson, supra, note 16.
2 6 Supra, note 16. In that case, a special verdict was called for, and sep-
arate questions were propounded by the judge.
27 Supra, note 5.
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damage might conceivably lie in the state in which the greatest
publication is made. In the case of a person who is not known out-
side one state this approach would have no merit, and would be
subject to the added criticism that its adoption would tend to cause
the law of New York to be applied in all states in this type of liti-
gation, due to the large population. Some resistance could be ex-
pected from the courts of other states.
No cases are found which follow this view. The law review
writer who suggested it28 cites one case as authority, but that case
does not deal with the choice of law problem.29 Nevertheless, it is
felt that there may be substantial reasons for considering the law
of the place of principal circulation in a proper case.
(7) PLURALITY OF STATES HAVING T=E SAIE LAW
As in the previous situation, there is no court support for this
proposition. The theory is that, faced with a difference in sub-
stantive law among the states in which a publication occurred, a
court would count the number of states following each particular
theory of law, and choose the one followed by the largest number
of states as the law to be applied in the case. The mere statement of
the concept demonstrates its absurdity. Not only would the court
have to determine the law of each state, but it would have to
classify them, so far as it would be possible, to be able to enumerate
each class. The most ludicrous result would arise in the event of
a tie.
The author who suggests the plurality principle states that it
would "only add to confusion." 30 The one case cited by that author
on the point did not adopt the rule, but, instead, held that the law
of each state would be applied.31
This survey of methods of approach to the conflict of laws
problem has been made to demonstrate that no one of them, stand-
ing alone, is a complete answer. In each instance, there is some un-
desirable result which would follow from a general application of
the rule.
We are driven, then, to the conclusion that there should be
an attempt to apply, not just one rule for every situation, but a
separate set of rules for each type of situation, or, in the alterna-
tive, some formula which would combine those meaningful rules
in such a manner that the law to be applied in each case would
28 Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
Mnem. L. REv. 734, 762 (1948).
29 Palmer v. Mahin, 120 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1903). The court stated that the
extent of the circulation of the newspaper was admissable in evidence to show
the amount of the plaintiff's damage.
30 Ludwig, op. cit., note 30.
31 O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D.C. Mass. 1940).
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be readily ascertainable, and, at the same time, subservient to
conflict of laws principles. It is believed that there is such a formula.
The court, in Date System v. General Teleradio,32 dealt with
the problem at some length, and concluded that the law of the state
having a "grouping of the dominant contacts" should be applied.
The contacts which were considered by the court were: (1) Sub-
stantive law of the forum; (2) Place of last event (first publica-
tion); (3) Point of origination; (4) State of principal circulation;
and (5) Domicil of the plaintiff.3 3 The conclusion reached was that,
since at least three of these (numbers (1), (3), and (4) ), and
possibly all five, pointed to the law of New York, the law of that
state would be applied.
While the court is to be commended for taking a long step in
the proper direction, its approach is subject to criticism, in that
there was no attempt to analyze the contacts to determine which
ones were actually meaningful, nor was there any recognition that
some contacts should have greater significance than others. More
simply, the court's analysis was quantitative rather than qualitative.
Further analysis, it is believed, would have revealed to the
court that some of the contacts it mentioned, and others which it
did not mention, have no real significance in choice of law prob-
lems, arid should not be considered. The first of these is the sub-
stantive law of the forum. To apply it as having substantive mean-
ing is to ignore conflict of laws principles.3 4 The same can be said
for the law of the place of the defendant's act, or the point of
origination, which permit the defendant to choose the applicable
law. Prior consideration has also eliminated the use of the law of
each individual state, or the law of a plurality of the states.
Thus, it is seen that only three meaningful contacts exist.
These are:
(1) Place of the first publication (last event), on the ground
that it is the place at which a cause of action first arises;
(2) Place where the plaintiff is actually damaged (residence),
on the ground that the real wrong exists there; and
(3) Place of principal circulation, on the ground that, in cer-
tain cases, it is where the greatest actual injury is incurred.
In the application of these three contacts, a formula may be
employed which, it is believed, results in the application, with
comparative ease and certainty, of the body of law having the most
significant connection in each case, and prevents either the plaintiff
or the defendant from controlling which law is to be utilized.
32 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
33 These are the contacts mentioned by Professor Ludwig in 32 Mnn. L.
REv. 734 (1948).
34A basic tenet of conflict of laws is that no person should be able to
decide which law is to be applied in his case by choosing a forum.
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We begin with the proposition that the law of the state of first
publication will be applied, on the last event theory. However, if
there is a showing that there was a publication in a state in which
the plaintiff is actually damaged (in most cases, the state of resi-
dence), that law will be applied. The final step is that, in the event
the plaintiff incurred actual damage in a number of states (celebrity
cases, usually), the law of the state in which the principal circul-
ation occurred will be applied.
Hence, using the numbers of the three contacts, (1) is applied
unless (2) occurs, in which event it is applied, except that if several
states are included in number (2), (3) applies.
It will be seen that the application of this formula does not
result in a great hardship upon the court. Furthermore, in each
case, the law which is applied will be utilized because it has the
strongest substantive connection with the transaction. Additional
justification for the application of the formula is found in the fact
that, regardless of where the plaintiff sues, or where the defendant
chooses to do business, the same law will be applied. The formula
also lessens the defendant's ability to control the law to be applied
by choosing his place of first publication, due to the application of
the" law of other states if there is a publication in another state in
which the plaintiff is known. It is admitted that in the case of a
national celebrity libeled in a national publication, New York law
is indicated, but no apology is called for because it is reasonable
to believe that the greatest damage would be incurred there, so
that New York would have the most substantive relation with the
matter.
CONCLUSION
The least which might be said for the outlined approach is
that it is more desirable than the present attitude of the courts.
Its adoption, or the adoption of a similar approach, would aid im-
mensely in the solution of choice of law problems in multi-state
tort cases and allied fields.
Paul M. Smart
1953]
